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Against Apocalypse: Kant, Finitude, and the Ends of Philosophy 
 
In 1796, having finished the essential part of his critical project, Kant published a 
short polemical intervention, “On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in 
Philosophy.”1 The immediate target of the polemic is a certain Johann Georg 
Schlosser, who had recently accused Kant’s critical philosophy of an 
“emasculation” (Entmannung) of reason depriving us of the capacity to “intimate” 
(ahnden) an absolute and divine reality behind the “veil of Isis” of the phenomenal 
world.2 Nonetheless, Kant’s essay is equally aimed at Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, 
another early critic of critical philosophy, who also insists on the possibility of an 
intuitive “intimation” (Ahndung) of divine perfection.3 On a more general and 
implicit level, Kant is attacking the entire nascent philosophy of German idealism 
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and its notion of an intellectual intuition of absolute principles.4 In Kant’s eyes, the 
proto-Romantic thinkers adopt a “superior” or “lofty” (vornehm) philosophical 
tone, an “aristocratic” intellectual posture in the sense that they consider 
themselves in a position to dispense with conceptual and discursive philosophical 
labor by claiming a privileged immediate access to supersensible or absolute 
things. “Intimation,” Kant points out, is “obscure expectation, and contains the 
hope of a solution”; but since this expected solution cannot be knowledge in the 
proper sense, it must assume the form of a “supernatural information (mystical 
illumination): which is then the death of all philosophy.”5 In truth, Kant maintains, 
the metaphor of a goddess concealed behind a “veil of Isis” is only an aesthetic 
manner of visualizing not some transcendent absolute entity but the fundamental 
source of normativity for our practical reason: the moral law, to which we do not 
relate by means of a cognitive “intimation” but rather through a moral sense of 
duty. To ask whether this source is to be located within the human being herself or 
in some other being, unknowable for us, is an inquiry from which “[a]t bottom we 
should perhaps do better to desist . . . altogether, since it is merely speculative”; 
that is, it is an attempt to reach beyond the limits of possible empirical knowledge 
by purely conceptual means, and is as such devoid of practical relevance.6 
For Kant, it is the inherent aspiration of speculative reason to attain an 
absolute reality that incites the thinkers with the “superior tone” to appeal to an 
immediate revelation of the absolute that would render philosophy superfluous as 
a rational and progressive venture. The same aspiration has led the dogmatic (that 
is, precritical) metaphysical tradition to strive for an insight into the ideal of 
speculative reason, an absolutely perfect being that would be the final cause, 
source, or substance of all other beings. In Kant’s eyes, speculative metaphysics 
from Aristotle to Leibniz is dominated by the “ontotheological” fallacy that 
derives from the necessity of the concept of a supreme being the real existence of 
such a being.7 This fallacy ignores the true lesson of the antinomies of pure reason, 
namely, the disparity between the empirical world and the internal structural 
requirements of reason. In the end, this ignorance exposes dogmatic metaphysics 
to the destructive attack of Hume’s skeptical empiricism. The only way out of this 
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philosophical impasse is the critical path of the delimitation and finitization of 
reason. By recognizing the status of the human being as a tragically split citizen of 
two realms, of the causally determined empirical world and the noumenal world 
of autonomous and teleological moral reason8—worlds that are reconciled only in 
moments of aesthetic experience and in judgments of beauty and sublimity, in 
which we encounter sensible things as conforming to teleological ends9—critical 
philosophy announces the irreversible end of metaphysics in its dogmatic form. In 
Kant’s Copernican revolution, metaphysics is transformed into reason’s critically 
limited and thus finite self-reflection on its own a priori conditions.10  
In his 1982 lecture, “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy,” 
Jacques Derrida calls attention to the fact that in spite its progressive outlook, 
Kant’s censure of the philosophical eschatology of the “mystagogues” as the 
“death of philosophy” is itself permeated by a certain type of eschatology, by an 
idea of the imminent end of a certain epoch of human reason. “But if Kant,” 
Derrida points out,  
 
denounces those who proclaim that philosophy has been at an end for two 
thousand years, he has himself, in marking a limit, indeed the end of a 
certain type of metaphysics, freed another wave of eschatological discourses 
in philosophy. . . . [F]rom then on and with multiple and profound 
differences, indeed mutations, being taken into account, the West has been 
dominated by a powerful program that was also an untransgressible contract 
among discourses of the end.11  
 
Kant’s declaration that there can be no immediate and absolute “final” 
revelation in philosophy, no “apocalypse” in the literal sense of the Greek 
apokalypsis, is already in itself, in a certain sense, a revelatory, “apocalyptic” 
gesture. To disallow, in the name of the inherent finitude of human cognition, the 
possibility of an apocalyptic end of philosophy in the form of an intuitive 
disclosure of the absolute is already to announce the end of a certain type of 
philosophy, of traditional metaphysical speculation. Kant thus, as Derrida notes, 
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becomes himself the founding father of the discourses on the end of metaphysics, 
or the end of classical philosophy as such, that resonate throughout nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century thought. 
Since Kant’s day, Western philosophy has grown more and more suspicious 
and intolerant of “superior tones,” of lofty absolutizing visions attempting to 
evade their own contextual situatedness or seeking to dismiss careful analytic and 
conceptual work. Finitude, deabsolutization, and intellectual modesty have 
become the philosophical order of the day. In what follows, we will take a brief 
look at this development in order to highlight a recent anomaly in the post-
Kantian ethic of philosophical finitude—a reemerging speculative tone, most 
prominent in the work of Quentin Meillassoux, bearing many resemblances to the 
superior tone of Kant’s early critics but resulting in a speculative type of 
materialism rather than idealism. This new tonality once again has the 
“apocalyptic” boldness to claim speculative access to absolute principles, and to 
thus renounce Kant’s declaration of the end of speculative philosophy, but in the 
name of another end, the end of the philosophy of finitude. Finally, we will see 
that by abandoning the “correlationism” inherent in the post-Kantian philosophy 
of finitude, Meillassoux’s speculative materialism also dismantles the close link 
forged by Kant between the teleological ends of human existence and a 
teleological notion of an “end of the world.” It thus allows us to consider 
philosophically, in a radically novel and transformed manner, the “eschatological” 
possibilities of human extinction and of an ultimate moral transfiguration and 
redemption of the world.  
 
The End of Finitude: From Correlationism to Speculative Materialism 
 
As we know, Kant’s immediate successors heavily disputed the status of finitude 
as a keyword for the ongoing upheaval in philosophy. For Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel, the Kantian deabsolutization and finitization of speculative reason is a 
fundamentally antinomic operation. As Kant himself is fully aware, finitude is a 
profoundly unsatisfactory position for thinking; it is “humiliating” (demütigend) 
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for reason to accept a nec plus ultra and to renounce its progress towards an 
absolute end, since it is “driven by a propensity of its nature . . . to find peace only 
in the completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole.”12 In assigning 
to itself an insuperable limit, speculative reason is, from the Hegelian point of 
view, paradoxically compelled to posit that which remains beyond the limit, the 
“thing-in-itself,” as its own transcendent outside or other and, thus, to determine 
this outside—that is to say, to appropriate it conceptually, which would precisely 
remove its complete transcendence to discursive thought.13 Hegel, who also rejects 
Jacobi’s notion of an immediate intuition of the absolute,14 develops instead a 
teleological eschatology of philosophical labor. In the course of the process of its 
discursive and dialectical mediation, the spirit gradually discovers an absolute 
level within itself, and through this discovery, philosophy is consummated and 
consolidated into a science of the absolute.  
It is only with Heidegger that finitude returns to the center of the 
philosophical stage in full force and in a radicalized form. At issue in his Being and 
Time is a reconsideration of human receptivity and discursivity, no longer in the 
Kantian sense as structural limitations of the human cognitive capacity to know 
beings from a hypothetical absolute viewpoint15 but rather as fully positive 
conditions of the “understanding of being” (Seinsverständnis) that characterizes 
Dasein, the human being insofar as she constitutes the finite and dynamic “there” 
(Da) of sense and meaningfulness.16 By overcoming the Kantian gap between the 
in-itself and the phenomenal and the Neo-Kantian separation of ontology and 
epistemology, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology is able to reappropriate 
critical philosophy as a preparatory groundwork for a new metaphysics—as a 
point of departure for a “fundamental ontology” whose “foundation” is nothing 
other than Dasein’s finitude.17 This finitude of Dasein is the inherently temporal 
structure of its existence, more precisely, the temporal dynamic that contextualizes 
Dasein’s understanding of being by situating all access to a meaningful present 
(Gegenwart) within an interplay of the intertwining dimensions of the future 
(Zukunft) and “having-been” (Gewesenheit), that is, of futural possibility—limited 
by death as the constant and ultimate possibility of impossibility—and already 
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established facticity.18 This temporality or timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) of Dasein’s 
understanding of being correlates structurally with temporality (Temporalität) as 
the meaning-horizon of being itself, and this temporally articulated correlation 
between finite and contextual access to meaningfulness and finite and contextual 
givenness of meaningfulness is the core, the fundament, of fundamental 
ontology.19 As the later Heidegger emphatically points out, no metaphysics in the 
classical sense can be built upon such a radically de-absolutized and de-
substantivized “foundation.”20 The temporal correlation between Dasein and being 
cannot be an absolute point of reference, in the literal sense of being “absolved” 
from all essential references and relations to anything other than itself.21 On the 
contrary, it is to be conceived as a dynamic event (Ereignis) of contextualization in 
which accessible, meaningful presence, the temporal present, is ceaselessly 
reconfigured in terms of temporal background dimensions. 
To the extent that classical metaphysics ultimately requires an absolute point 
of reference, an “ontotheological” supreme or ultimate instance of being, 
fundamental ontology’s model of the irreducible temporal contextuality of being is 
oriented toward a postmetaphysical mode of thinking, toward another, radically 
deabsolutized beginning or “inception” (Anfang) of Western thought.22 While the 
Hegelian speculative dialectic—for Heidegger, the culmination of the modern 
metaphysics of subjectivity and of Western ontotheological metaphysics as a 
whole—sees itself as “the Absolute’s coming-to-itself,” which “leads to the 
sublation [Aufhebung] of the finitude of the human being,” in the Heideggerian 
postmetaphysical perspective, as he points out in 1962, “it is precisely finitude that 
comes into view—not only the finitude of the human being, but the finitude of the 
event [Ereignis] itself.”23 Heidegger distinguishes his own understanding of 
finitude from that of Kant in that the former “is no longer thought in terms of the 
relation to infinity, but rather as finitude in itself: finitude, end, limit, the proper 
[das Eigene]—being harbored into the proper [ins Eigene Geborgensein].”24 Finitude 
is no longer a deficient mode of infinity but precisely that which is “proper” for 
the human being; in finitude, human thinking is at home, sheltered and 
“harbored.” 
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Heideggerian finitude—the finitude of the human being as a situated and 
mortal recipient and interpreter of sense and meaning, the finitude of being as the 
historical and contextual advent of meaningfulness, and the finitude of the event 
of their correlation or belonging-together—haunts the phenomenological, 
hermeneutical, poststructuralist, and deconstructive manifestations of late modern 
thought, that is, the contemporary heirs of Kant’s critical philosophy. Alain 
Badiou, an ardent critic of this legacy, is entirely justified in accusing Kant of being 
“the inventor of the disastrous theme of our ‘finitude.’ ”25 As analyzed by Michel 
Foucault in The Order of Things, in spite of its focus on the human being as the 
constituting transcendental subject of knowledge, philosophy from Kant to 
Heidegger is compelled to address also the situated and finite reality of the human 
being as a material, incarnate object of empirical knowledge, and thus becomes an 
“analytic of finitude.”26 Foucault here predicts an imminent “end” of the human 
being as the focal point of post-Kantian thought: The inherent contradictions and 
tensions of this “empirico-transcendental doublet” are becoming unsurmountable, 
and the anthropological paradigm of the modern Kantian episteme is being 
overcome toward a new kind of Nietzschean analysis of the historical forces that 
“produce” the human being as the discursive subject of thinking and as the subject 
to power.27 
In any case, it is clear that attempts to seriously confront the Heideggerian 
hermeneutics of finitude must begin by challenging Kant’s transcendental 
idealism. During the last ten years, such an altercation has taken place in the form 
of a rather heterogeneous and primarily Anglo-American philosophical movement 
known by the collective name of speculative realism. This new anti-Kantianism 
draws its principal inspiration from a single work published in French in 2006 by 
Quentin Meillassoux and suggestively titled After Finitude: An Essay on the 
Necessity of Contingency. In his preface to the book, Badiou, Meillassoux’s most 
important mentor, credits After Finitude with a momentous accomplishment: the 
introduction of an entirely new avenue of contemporary thought, an intellectual 
option transgressing the canonical Kantian threefold of dogmatic, skeptical, and 
critical philosophy.28 Meillassoux’s path is a speculative one in that it claims access 
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to the “thing-in-itself” by purely logical and argumentative means; however, as in 
German idealism, this speculation is of a postcritical, nondogmatic type. In 
contrast to speculative idealism as well as “naive,” historical, and physicalist 
materialisms, Meillassoux’s position is that of speculative materialism. 
Speculative materialism is to be understood first and foremost as a 
confrontation with the approach that Meillassoux terms correlationism: the 
affirmation, in one sense or another, of the unsurpassable character of the idea 
“according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking 
and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.”29 
Correlationism is a more inclusive term than idealism. Without necessarily 
reducing being to the activity of subjectivity, the correlationist simply maintains 
that any naively realistic notion of being apart from a constitutive correlation with 
thinking is either cognitively inaccessible or simply incoherent, and insists that the 
same applies to any Cartesian notion of a thinking that is not in an intrinsic 
intentional correlation with being. For Meillassoux’s correlationist, being, insofar 
as we have access to it, is given being; thinking, in turn, is essentially receptivity to 
this givenness. Kant’s critical idealism is a “weak” version of correlationism 
according to which we only have access to being to the extent that it accords with 
the transcendental structures of our faculties of sensibility and understanding. 
Nonetheless, the notion of an absolute and noncorrelated domain of “things in 
themselves” remains, for Kant, coherent and intelligible, even necessary, even 
though it is fated to remain without any intuitive content.30 As we have seen, this 
weak position exposes itself to the move by which speculative idealism abandons 
the thing-in-itself and absolutizes the correlation between thinking and being as 
such.31  
“Strong” correlationism is, for Meillassoux, a development eminently 
represented by Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Like speculative idealism, it 
renounces the Kantian thing-in-itself: For the strong correlationist, being can have 
no other plausible meaning than being-correlated. However, at the same time, 
strong correlationism denies the absoluteness of the correlation, regarding it as 
radically factical and situated in the sense that the correlation and its structures 
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cannot be derived from any absolutely necessary principle, but must rather be 
accepted as elementary facts.32 This deabsolutization of the correlation leaves 
philosophy without any kind of absolute validity; such validity is, moreover, seen 
by strong correlationism as an obsolete ontotheological ideal. Heidegger asks in 
his Contributions to Philosophy: “Can the ‘why’ still be made into a tribunal before 
which beyng [Seyn; that is, being considered from a postmetaphysical perspective] 
is to be placed? . . . Why beyng? From within it itself. . . . Ground-less [grund-los]; 
unfathomable [abgründig].”33 
As in the case of the speculative idealists’ overcoming of Kant, speculative 
materialism seeks to perform a dialectical sublation of the strong, Heideggerian 
and Wittgensteinian version of correlationism. This presupposes an inherent 
contradiction in the position to be sublated, and such a contradiction is discovered 
by Meillassoux at the heart of strong correlationism’s thesis of the facticity of the 
correlation, within the Heideggerian account of mortality (even though he does 
not cite it directly), in particular. In Being and Time, the finitude of existential time 
is determined by the constant possibility of death as the possibility of 
impossibility—as the ultimate and unsurmountable possibility delimiting all other 
futural possibilities. Dasein constantly faces the possible absence of its entire 
horizon of possibilities, in other words, the possible absence of all existential 
meaningfulness. This possibility is the “ultimate” possibility precisely to the extent 
that it cannot be realized within lived existential time; the phenomenological 
reality of this possibility is to be a mere limit of phenomenality as such.34 It is 
precisely here that Meillassoux spots a contradiction comparable to that with 
which Hegel faulted Kant, maintaining that it is impossible to conceive a limit 
only from within, one-sidedly, without any relation or reference to that which lies 
beyond the limit.35 Meillassoux argues that grasping death as a possibility, as an 
extreme limit of one’s own temporal horizon, inevitably presupposes that one also 
grasps death as a reality, that is, as the actual total absence of the correlation. When 
the strong correlationist conceives the correlation as finite, as constitutively 
determined by its own possible absence, she has, in effect, already transgressed the 
correlational domain of phenomenal meaningfulness toward a noncorrelational 
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and absolute reality of the “in-itself.” In other words, the only coherent manner in 
which the strong correlationist can distinguish herself from the speculative 
idealist, who refuses to assign any constitutive role to mortality, is by 
acknowledging death (the absence of the correlation) as a real possibility, a 
possibility that cannot be reduced to the role of a mere structural limit of the 
correlation.36  
 
But how are these states [sc. mortality, annihilation, becoming-wholly-other 
in death] conceivable as possibilities? On account of the fact that we are able 
to think—by dint of the absence of any reason for our being—a capacity-to-
be-other capable of abolishing us, or of radically transforming us. But if so, 
then this capacity-to-be-other cannot be conceived as a correlate of our thinking, 
precisely because it harbors the possibility of our own non-being. . . . Thus, the 
[strong] correlationist’s refutation of idealism proceeds by way of an 
absolutization . . . of the capacity-to-be-other presupposed in the thought of 
facticity.37 
 
According to this argument, mortality, understood as the constitutive 
relation of finite and factical thinking to its temporal finitude, logically entails that 
thinking can relate to a reality without thinking, without the correlation. Thinking 
can, in one way or another, access a reality from which thinking is absent, even 
though this access obviously cannot be of a phenomenal or experiential nature. 
For Meillassoux, who here follows Badiou’s thesis that ontology and mathematics 
are one and the same, our mode of access to the “in-itself” will consist in a purely 
mathematical reflection on the formal structures of multiplicities.38 
The point of Meillassoux’s argument is to compel the strong correlationist to 
admit that in the end, she conceives the correlation not only as factical, in the 
phenomenological sense of “given without absolute necessity,” but rather as a 
contingent fact that may equally well cease to be. But since the strong correlationist 
admits no absolutely valid necessity, this conversion of facticity into contingency 
entails the acknowledgment that every being is radically contingent, that is, equally 
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conceivable as not being. However, Meillassoux emphasizes that it is logically 
impossible to conceive this total contingency itself as a contingent fact, as this 
would impose the absurd conclusion that there could just as well (contingently) be 
a necessary being. The principle of contingency must itself be absolutely 
necessary: We must say that it is absolutely impossible for any being to be 
necessary.39 Meillassoux shows that this absolute principle further entails a 
principle of “unreason” (irraison), which is a negation of the Leibnizian principle 
of sufficient reason and states that nothing has a necessitating reason for being as it 
is, as well as a principle of “factuality” (factualité), according to which to be is to be 
a contingent fact.40  
The conversion of the principle of facticity into the principle of contingency 
is, for Meillassoux, the “end of finitude” in philosophy, the end of the 
predominance of the post-Kantian focus on the human being as the empirico-
transcendental doublet, that is, as a finite being of the world who is also the 
constitutive subject of meaningful experience. Just as Hegel was the end of 
Kantian “weak” finitude, Meillassoux sees himself as the end of Heideggerian 
“strong” finitude. The deabsolutizing program of correlationism cannot be 
completed: In the end, renouncing the absoluteness of the correlation results in the 
absolutization of the contingency of the correlation, and of all other beings. After 
the collapse of speculative idealism, the only remaining option that is truly 
coherent is speculative materialism. Like strong correlationism, this latter position 
is “postmetaphysical” to the extent that it is not ontotheological: In speculative 
materialism, the absolute is no longer a determinate being or substance but rather 
a structural feature of all beings (their contingency). We thus see that speculative 
materialism is not a simple return to precritical, dogmatic metaphysics. It adopts 
the post-Kantian thesis on the end of classical metaphysics, but insists that 
postmetaphysics needs its own kind of absolute—philosophical thought simply 
cannot survive without any kind of absolute. 
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After Finitude: Human Ends and the Ends of the World 
 
In the Kantian context, human finitude refers to the essential receptivity and 
incompleteness of human cognition, the inherent limitations these place on the 
scope of speculative reason, as well as the resulting increased dependency of the 
human being on her practical reason as a moral agent. The teleological “end” of 
the cognitively finite human—the finality in which the most proper human 
autonomy is realized—is thus, for Kant, not an insight into the absolute that 
would breach the “veil of Isis” covering it, but rather the “good will,” a purely 
rational practical orientation towards an ideal of a “kingdom of ends,” a moral 
perfection of the world, motivated solely by respect for the moral law and the 
duties it entails.41  
It is important to see that this understanding of the regulative moral end of 
the human being is coupled with a regulative moral notion of the end of the world 
as a whole. In “The End of All Things” (1794), Kant briefly reconstructs what he 
believes to be the rational core of the religious idea of an end of the world and a 
last judgment. As analyzed by Kant, religious eschatology has its ultimate roots in 
the teleological idea of reason according to which “the duration of the world has 
worth only insofar as the rational beings in it conform to the final end of their 
existence; if, however, this is not supposed to be achieved, then creation itself 
appears purposeless to them, like a play having no resolution.”42 If the end of the 
world is understood in this way, as a narrative resolution of our striving for moral 
improvement in the form of an ideal distribution of perfect justice, it becomes 
quite comprehensible, even natural, for our practical reason. By contrast, on the 
theoretical and cognitive level, we are completely incapable of representing an end 
of the world in the sense of an end of time, since time is the fundamental form of 
our sensible intuition without which empirical experience becomes unintelligible. 
The end of temporal succession, which is equivalent to the end of all alteration and 
change, “outrages the imagination” of “a being which can become conscious of its 
existence and the magnitude of this existence (as duration) only in time.”43 Those 
who ponder over the significance of the end of the world therefore seek to grasp 
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that which is wholly transcendent to knowledge and understanding and thus lose 
themselves in a “mysticism . . . where reason does not understand either itself or 
what it wants.”44 An “apocalypse” in the literal sense of a direct cognitive 
“revelation” of the “end of all things” is thus impossible, as it would immediately 
compel speculative reason to run against its own correlational limits that prevent 
it from thinking the end of thought.  
The Heideggerian “strong” version of human finitude is, on the other hand, 
rooted in the existential temporality that structures Dasein’s factical situatedness 
and its orientation towards a futural dimension of possibilities, delimited by death 
as the ultimate possibility of Dasein’s own non-being. In this sense of finitude, 
human fulfillment or “properness” (Eigentlichkeit), that which is most proper to the 
situated and finite human being, consists in her being appropriated (ereignet) into 
the situated and finite event of meaningfulness; the most appropriate human 
destination or destiny is to be the “addressee” or recipient of being. 
 
The human being and being are assigned [übereignet] to each other. They 
belong to each other. . . . We must experience simply this lending [Eignen] in 
which the human being and being lend themselves to each other [einander ge-
eignet sind], that is, we must enter into what we call the event [Ereignis]. . . . 
The event is the reach [Bereich] . . . through which the human being and being 
reach [erreichen] each other in their essence [Wesen].45 
 
Even this teleology of human being intertwines with a certain eschatology, a 
certain “end of the world.” Since “world” is here no longer the Kantian universal 
community of rational moral agents but rather a plurality of interlocking but 
singular worlds, correlating with singular instances of human being-in-the-world, 
death, as the temporal limit of my horizon of possibilities, is also the end of a 
world, my world. Since there is no impersonal transcendental subjectivity but 
Dasein is “in each instance mine” (je meines), situated and finite, one’s own death is 
the end of the world, the only accessible one.46 This is perhaps most succinctly 
stated by Wittgenstein, whom Meillassoux points out as the second main 
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representative of strong correlationism, in his Tractatus: “[I]n death . . . the world 
does not change, but ceases. Death is not an event in life. Death is not lived 
through.”47 It is more vividly expressed in Derrida’s foreword to Chaque fois 
unique, la fin du monde, a compilation of addresses on the occasion of the deaths of 
several of his friends. “Death,” Derrida writes, 
 
declares, each time, the end of the world in totality, . . . the end of the world 
itself, of the only world there is, each time. Singularly. Irreversibly. For the 
other and, in a strange way, for the temporary survivor who endures the 
impossible experience of death. . . . [D]eath, death itself, if there is such a 
thing, leaves no room whatsoever, not the least possibility, for the singular 
and unique world to be replaced or to survive, the “singular and unique” 
that makes each living being (animal, human, or divine) a singular and 
unique living being.48  
 
For both versions of correlationism, the “end of the world” thus has the 
function of a teleological limit, an “end” grasped only in terms of human 
orientedness toward an impossible experience of completion and closure, toward 
an end of time that as such remains inconceivable for a temporal being. 
Meillassoux’s speculative materialism, by contrast, challenges the very question of 
the “ends” of human existence, based on implicit teleological ideas of 
purposiveness: Accepting the thesis of absolute contingency as the eternal truth 
about all things prevents one from relating to human existence “as if” it had an 
inherent purpose or end, even a merely regulative one. From that moment, the 
speculative question concerning the reason for human existence also ceases to be 
an impossible or meaningless metaphysical problem that must be transformed 
into the correlational question concerning the aim, ideal, or meaning of existence. 
On the contrary, it becomes once more a philosophical question of fundamental 
importance to which speculative materialism provides a very simple and concise 
answer: There is no reason whatsoever, since the existence of human beings as 
rational and meaning-experiencing subjects is a purely contingent fact.  
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Instead of laughing or smiling at questions like “Where do we come from?” 
“Why do we exist?” we should ponder instead the remarkable fact that the 
replies “From nothing. For nothing” really are answers. . . . There is no longer 
a mystery, not because there is no longer a problem, but because there is no 
longer a reason.49 
 
As Kant himself acknowledges, without a teleological idea of human ends, 
we have no need for the idea of an end of the world. In fact, Meillassoux shows 
that the very notion of an “end of all things” is logically excluded by the principle 
of absolute contingency, which entails that at all times something contingent must 
exist, rather than nothing: All things cannot cease to be, since then there would no 
longer be anything capable of not being.50 For speculative materialism, too, the 
end of time is an impossible concept—not because the correlation is irreducibly 
temporally structured, but because time as the absolute dimension of the infinite 
succession of contingent things and facts is an irreducible feature of contingency.51  
Moreover, once strong correlationism’s understanding of being as 
irreducibly correlated with the finite and situated existence of thinking and of 
temporality as a structure of this correlation are abandoned, death is no longer 
understood as an end of the world or as an end of time. While Meillassoux’s main 
concern lies with the conceivability of an “ancestral” reality prior to the emergence 
of sentient life, he notes that the same applies to “possible events that are ulterior 
to the extinction of the human species.”52 My death, as well as the death of 
everybody—the end of humankind, the death of all beings capable of thinking and 
experiencing meaningfulness and purpose—become perfectly possible and 
conceivable events within endless time. The consequences of this have been 
intimated by Ray Brassier, another name often associated with “speculative 
realism,” in Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (2007), which highlights 
the possible extinction of humankind as the central theme of a new and 
emancipatory philosophical nihilism. Death is now thematized as the biological 
demise of the human species, even of all terrestrial life, that no finite and situated 
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correlation can survive but which would not affect the thing-in-itself in its 
absolute essence in the least. “Nihilism,” Brassier exclaims, “is not an existential 
quandary but a speculative opportunity. Thinking has interests that do not 
coincide with those of living.”53  
 
Speculative Eschatology: The God to Come 
 
Meillassoux’s speculative materialism thus introduces a transformed and 
paradoxical perspective on the discourses of the end orienting post-Kantian 
thought. It accepts the thesis of the end of ontotheological metaphysics, but not 
that of the end of absolutes, and most decidedly rejects declarations of an end of 
modernity. The return of absolutizing speculative thought, Meillassoux claims, 
precisely offers modernity an opportunity to recover from the profound “schism” 
between its “Copernican,” mathematized science and its “Ptolemaic,” 
correlationist philosophy; this legitimates speculative materialism’s claim to be the 
true calling of modernity, the true “Copernican revolution” in philosophy.54  
And yet, even as it thus negates, in a rediscovered “superior” and 
“apocalyptic” tone, the foundations of critical philosophy—the finitude of 
speculative reason and the moral necessity of a practical teleology of the human 
being and the world—this new Meillassouxian materialism also proposes a new 
kind of philosophical eschatology, indeed, a new hope of miraculous salvation. 
One of the most surprising consequences of the speculative thesis of absolute 
contingency is the rational legitimation of awaiting miracles. A considerable 
portion of After Finitude is dedicated to arguing that the correct answer to Hume’s 
problem concerning the validity of inductive reasoning is to affirm that the laws of 
nature, in the sense of hitherto observed regularities in causal connections, are just 
as contingent and capable of change as any individual things.55 The laws of nature 
have no a priori hold on what we are allowed to hope from the future. Phenomena 
that are completely unpredictable, unexpected, or even physically impossible in 
the light of current empirical knowledge are rationally just as possible as any 
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other, more regular occurrences. In published excerpts from the manuscript of his 
announced forthcoming magnum opus, Divine Inexistence: Essay on the Virtual God, 
Meillassoux mentions the emergence of biological life and that of sentient life as 
examples of such (in retrospect) completely unmotivated ex nihilo events.56 
Against the Kantian premise that the structure of our practical reason is such 
that it inherently needs to postulate teleological ideals in order to make moral 
agency rational, one of Meillassoux’s principal, but still unelaborated, aims is to 
provide a radical alternative account of a morality based entirely on hope. In his 
2006 essay “Spectral Dilemma,” which allegedly anticipates some of the central 
themes of Divine Inexistence, Meillassoux revisits the classical problem of theodicy 
by calling our attention to the problem of striking injustices—in particular, 
“essential deaths,” deaths so horrible, unacceptable, and irreconcilable that they 
keep haunting survivors as “essential specters.”57 To this “spectral dilemma,” an 
atheistic approach is just as incapable of offering a satisfactory resolution as a 
religious one: Either there is a divine providence that has permitted these terrible 
injustices and is thus unfit to reconcile us to them, even if it has the power to do 
so, or there is no reconciling providence at all. The third, alternative resolution 
held out by Meillassoux, rationally justified through his principle of contingency, 
is a legitimate but unfounded hope for the completely unmotivated and 
miraculous future emergence of such a divine power—of the intervention of a god 
“to come” (Dieu à venir), a divinity who does not yet exist but, once existent, would 
have the capacity to bring about divine justice, even to resurrect the “essential 
dead.” Nonetheless, such a miraculous advent cannot be the object of faith or 
conviction, as it will necessarily remain purely contingent, neither more nor less 
plausible than any other coherently conceivable event.  
What is important in this brief sketch is that in the place of the Kantian 
regulative “moral faith” in a teleologically ordained world that will ultimately 
result in moral perfection—demanded by practical reason but without any 
possible empirical basis—speculative materialism argues for the legitimacy of a 
completely unfounded “moral hope” of a moral improvement and redemption of 
the world or, rather, for the emergence of a new world of justice based on a divine 
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intervention.58 As Meillassoux puts it in the manuscript excerpts from Divine 
Inexistence:  
 
I propose that the [Kantian] kingdom of ends . . . ought to be rethought as the 
anticipation by humans of the possible advent of a novelty ulterior to themselves. . . . 
This awaiting [of a world of divine justice] is not faith, since the event that 
serves as its object of hope is explicitly determined as a possibility that can be 
produced or not produced. No necessity, no probability, can guarantee its 
advent. But no impossibility and no improbability can discourage us from 
anticipating that it might happen.59 
 
In these excerpts, Meillassoux also briefly delineates a striking new form of 
humanism. The fact that human contingency excludes any particular inherent 
aims or purposes of human existence does not mean that an important dignity and 
value cannot be attributed to human beings. This value consists in the simple fact 
that of all contingent beings, humans are, in fact, the first ones to become aware of 
the eternal truth of absolute contingency (in particular, after the introduction of 
speculative materialism).60 But as religions and classical philosophies have always 
emphasized, mortality—susceptibility to sudden, unexpected, and unjust death—
is in conflict with this dignity and ultimately incompatible with human self-
esteem. Therefore, the “world of justice,” a world that would represent an 
essential qualitative improvement in comparison to the present one and for which 
we are inclined to hope, would be one of “immanent immortality” and of 
resurrection for those who have already died. The self-imposed task of thesis of 
“divine inexistence” is to legitimate this hope on strictly nonreligious and rational 
terms.61  
The thesis according to which we live in a universe totally deprived of 
reasons and necessities, a world in which anything can happen, thus paradoxically 
bestows rational legitimacy on the Heideggerian hope of a new god arriving to 
save us, albeit in a very different sense from that intended by Heidegger.62 The 
Meillassouxian divinity to come is not the supreme, necessary, and perfect being 
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of scholastic metaphysics, not the hidden god of the mystagogues that only lets 
itself be intimated behind a veil of Isis, not a postulate of practical reason and 
object of moral faith, not the Heideggerian “ultimate god” as a nonsubstantial 
dimension or vector of meaningfulness, not the “postmodern,” purely potential 
god “without being,” but rather a “virtual” god who actually can be but for the 
moment, contingently, is not. The eventual emergence of such a perfectly just, 
omnipotent, and omniscient being would correspond to the Kantian moral end of 
the world, but would, nonetheless, be a contingent end, not the eschaton in the 
sense of an “end of days” but rather an event within infinite time.63 
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